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Introduction
Every September, the heads of state and other high-level 
country representatives gather in New York at the start of a 
new session of the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) and address the Assembly in the General Debate 
(GD). The GD provides the governments of the almost 200 
UN member states with an opportunity to present their 
views on international conflict and cooperation, terrorism, 
development, climate change and other key issues in inter-
national politics. As such, the statements made during the 
GD are an invaluable and largely untapped source of infor-
mation on governments’ policy preferences across a wide 
range of issues over time.
Government preferences are central to the study of inter-
national relations and comparative politics. As preferences 
cannot be directly observed, they must be inferred from 
states’ observed behaviour. One approach has been to use 
military alliances as an indicator of preference similarity 
(e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, 1983). This approach, however, 
provides little information about preferences when states 
do not have alliances. Scholars have instead overwhelm-
ingly relied on UNGA voting records to estimate foreign 
policy preferences (see Bailey et al., 2015; Voeten, 2013). 
However, UNGA voting-based methods – like all measures 
of preference – rely on certain assumptions and, as such, 
have both strengths and limitations (see Voeten, 2013). For 
example, one shortcoming is that estimates of state prefer-
ence are derived from the limited number of issues that are 
voted on in the UNGA in a given year.1 Therefore, it is 
essential that researchers can draw on additional data and 
measures to avoid producing findings about government 
preferences that are based on one type of observed state 
behaviour.
We argue that the application of text analytic methods to 
GD statements can provide much-needed additional meas-
ures and tools that can broaden our understanding of gov-
ernment preferences and their effects. The use of text 
analytic methods is rapidly gaining ground in comparative 
politics and legislative studies (see Herzog and Benoit, 
2015; Laver et al., 2003; Proksch and Slapin, 2010). To 
date, however, there has been little effort to use speeches to 
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estimate policy preferences in international relations. The 
formal and institutionalised setting of the GD, its inclusion 
of all UN member states, which are provided with equal 
opportunity to address the Assembly, and the fact that it 
takes place every year, makes it an ideal resource from 
which to derive, using text analysis, estimates of state pref-
erences that can be applied to systematic analyses of inter-
national politics.
This paper introduces a new dataset, the UN GD corpus 
(UNGDC), consisting of 7314 GD statements from 1970–
2014, that we have preprocessed, categorised and prepared 
for empirical applications. In the next section, we discuss 
the characteristics, content and purpose of the UN GD. 
Second, we explain the process of collecting and preproc-
essing the statements, and provide an overview of the 
UNGDC. We then use the text as data approach to show 
how the UNGDC can be used as a resource from which 
estimates of government preferences can be derived, pro-
viding applications of these estimates. We conclude by out-
lining potential uses of the UNGDC in future research.
The UN GD and world politics
The GD marks the start of the UNGA regular session each 
year. By tradition, the opening speech is made by Brazil, 
with the US also scheduled to speak on the first day. 
Typically, the heads of state and governments speak during 
the first days of the GD, followed by vice-presidents, dep-
uty prime ministers and foreign ministers, and concluding 
with the heads of delegation to the UN (Bailey, 1960; Luard 
and Heater, 1994; Nicholas, 1959; Smith, 2006).
The GD provides governments with an opportunity to 
declare, and to have on public record, their official position 
on various major international events of the past year 
(Smith, 2006). In addition, country representatives use the 
GD venue to present their governments’ perspectives on 
broader underlying issues in international politics. Their 
speeches frequently deal with issues of mutual concern 
such as terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, development 
and aid, and climate change, often appealing to the interna-
tional community to do more to tackle these issues. For 
example, in 1995, the US discussed UN reform, non-prolif-
eration, terrorism, money laundering and the narcotics 
trade in its GD statement. In turn, the UK and France both 
drew attention to the challenges of UN peacekeeping, while 
India discussed terrorism, disarmament, human rights and 
concerns about the inability of global institutions, such as 
the WTO, to address the needs of the Global South.
There are several important characteristics of GD 
speeches that have implications for their use in deriving 
estimates of state preferences from them. In contrast to 
UNGA roll-call votes, which are directly linked to the 
adoption of UN resolutions, GD speeches are not institu-
tionally connected to decision-making within the UN. As a 
consequence, states face lower external constraints and 
pressures when delivering GD statements than when voting 
in the UNGA. Indeed, studies that use UNGA voting high-
light the various constraints countries face when voting as 
a result of, among other things, aid relationships and strate-
gic voting blocs (see Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Kim and 
Russett, 1996; Voeten, 2000). The lack of external con-
straints means that when delivering their GD statements, 
governments have more leverage with the positions they 
take and the issues they emphasise. Hence, GD statements 
provide more information on key national priorities than 
the limited number of votes in the UNGA.
This view is supported by interviews conducted by the 
authors with members of the diplomatic community. The 
Deputy Representative of the Finnish Mission to the UN, 
for example, explained, ‘speeches at the General Debate 
are interesting because they flesh out national policies – 
what states think … the General Debate is the one place 
where states can speak their mind; it reflects the issues that 
states consider important’. Similarly, a spokesperson for 
the German Mission to the UN stated that the absence of 
external pressures when delivering GD statements means 
‘these speeches are the most sovereign thing that a country 
does as a member of the UN’.2 It is clear that non-demo-
cratic regimes also attach great importance to GD state-
ments. For example, members of Russia’s inner political 
circle not only viewed the 2015 GD statement as a key 
summary of the country’s foreign policy concerns, they 
were also apparently aware of its content weeks in advance.3
A significant consequence of the relative lack of exter-
nal constraints in the GD is that member states can more 
freely express their government’s perspectives on issues 
deemed important – including more contentious issues. As 
Smith (2006: 155) argues, a key function of the GD is that 
‘it provides members with the opportunity to blow off 
steam on contentious issues without causing undue dam-
age’. This is particularly relevant for smaller nations who 
can use the GD to raise more disagreeable political issues 
(see Nicholas, 1959). For example, in 2014, Antigua and 
Barbuda’s statement emphasised the failure of the US gov-
ernment to adhere to a ruling from the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body that stated that the US should pay com-
pensation to Antigua and Barbuda. In making this com-
plaint, the Antiguan representative highlighted the 
importance of the GD for smaller nations, stating ‘my small 
nation has no military might, no economic clout. All that 
we have is membership of the international system as our 
shield and our voice in this body as our sword.’
The fewer external constraints on representatives when 
delivering GD statements does not, however, imply that 
these speeches are not strategic. Scholars have long recog-
nised that ‘member states present themselves exclusively in 
the guise in which they wish to be known’ during these 
annual debates (Nicholas, 1959: 98). In fact, a key purpose 
of the GD is that it provides governments with the opportu-
nity to ‘influence international perceptions of their state, 
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aiming to position their states favorably, as well as to influ-
ence the perception of other states’ (Hecht, 2016: 10). 
Therefore, governments use GD speeches strategically to 
signal their preferences among the community of states. 
This use of strategic signalling in the GD can be seen when 
we compare references to Iran in the US statements of 2012 
and 2013. In the 2012 address, President Obama4 was 
highly critical of Iran:
In Iran we see where the path of a violent and unaccountable 
ideology leads […] Time and again, it has failed to take the 
opportunity to demonstrate its nuclear program is peaceful 
[…] Make no mistake: a nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge 
that can be contained. It would threaten the elimination of 
Israel, the security of Gulf nations and the stability of the 
global economy […] and that is why the United States will do 
what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
In contrast, speaking a year later4, the US president was 
more reconciliatory, offering to give diplomacy one last 
chance in relation to Iran’s nuclear programme:
if we can resolve the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, that can 
serve as a major step down a long road towards a different 
relationship, one based on mutual interests and mutual respect 
[…] America prefers to resolve its concerns over Iran’s nuclear 
program peacefully […] We are not seeking regime change, 
and we respect the right of the Iranian people to access peaceful 
nuclear energy.
A few hours later during the same session, President 
Rouhani in his address4 also emphasised diplomacy and 
the hope of reaching a compromise. The world has subse-
quently learned that the US and Iran held secret talks in 
the background, which eventually led to the breakthrough 
and signing of the intermediate deal (Borger and Kamali, 
2013). As such, the change in rhetoric between 2012 and 
2013 demonstrates the strategic nature of GD speeches. A 
further example of both the importance placed by govern-
ments on the GD address and its strategic purpose is pro-
vided by the Chilcot Inquiry into the UK’s role in the Iraq 
War. The report contains a memo sent by Prime Minister 
Tony Blair to President George W. Bush, complimenting 
the US president on the speech delivered at the 2002 GD 
that set out the case for war, ‘It was a brilliant speech … 
it puts us on exactly the right strategy to get the job 
done.’5 Hence, the US speech was seen as part of the US 
and UK strategy to build support for intervention in Iraq.
The lack of external constraints on member states in 
delivering GD statements means that they can use their 
address to indicate the issues considered most important 
by devoting more attention to these topics. As govern-
ments can choose what issues to discuss or ignore, and 
how strongly to emphasise certain issues, the GD pro-
vides detailed information about a government’s position 
on a policy issue and, also, the importance – or salience 
– of an issue for a government. As Smith (2006: 155) 
notes, the GD acts ‘as a barometer of international opin-
ion on important issues, even those not on the agenda for 
that particular session’. The focus on position and sali-
ence means that GD speeches can be used to uncover the 
most important topics that emerge in international poli-
tics over time.
UNGDC: The UN General Debate 
corpus
The speeches made in the GD are subsequently deposited at 
the UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library. However, statements 
made before 1992 are stored as image copies of typewritten 
documents. These are of very poor quality and require addi-
tional preprocessing using optical character recognition 
software. We collected speeches through the dedicated 
webpages of the individual UNGA GDs and the UN 
Bibliographic Information System (UNBIS).
Speeches are typically delivered in the native language. 
Based on the rules of the Assembly, all statements are then 
translated by UN staff into the six official languages of the 
UN. If a speech was delivered in a language other than 
English, we use the official English version provided by the 
UN. Therefore, all of the speeches in the UNGDC are in 
English.
The annual sessions are assigned numbers, starting with 
the first session in 1946 up to the most recent seventieth 
session in 2015. We collected all GD speeches from 1970 
(Session 25) to 2014 (Session 69). In total, there are 7314 
country statements delivered between 1970–2014. The 
number of countries participating in the GD increased from 
70 in 1970 to 193 in 2014 in line with the increase in UN 
membership. Non-member states may also participate in 
the GD (e.g. the Holy See and Palestine). Several states that 
previously participated in the GD have ceased to exist. 
Where possible, we linked such states to their legal succes-
sor states (e.g. USSR and the Russian Federation). If this 
was not possible we kept speeches in the data under the 
country’s last known name (e.g. German Democratic 
Republic). Overall, the corpus contains the GD contribu-
tions from 198 countries. On average, speeches contain 123 
sentences and 945 unique words.6
Table 1 provides an overview of the UNGDC. It shows 
average frequency of types (unique form of a word), tokens 
(individual words) and sentences for each individual speech 
in the text corpus. In terms of who delivered the statement, 
for sessions with identifiable speakers and their posts, 1909 
(44.3%) were delivered by heads of state or government 
(e.g. presidents, prime ministers, kings), 2126 (49.3%) by 
vice-presidents, deputy prime ministers and foreign minis-
ters and 276 (6.4%) by country representative at the UN.7
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Empirical application: Preferences on 
single-issue dimensions
The UNGDC can be used by scholars who require easy 
access to the statements and may want to read a particular 
text, or compare selected statements. Primarily, however, 
we envision the UNGDC to be used in quantitative applica-
tions looking at the nature, formation and effects of state 
preferences in world politics. Treating text as data has a 
long tradition in political science (for a review, see Laver, 
Table 1. UN GD corpus.
Year UN 
membership
GD 
statements
Types  
(mean freq)
Tokens  
(mean freq)
Sentences  
(mean freq)
1970 127 70 1569 8230 257
1971 132 116 1336 5927 230
1972 132 125 1157 4895 180
1973 135 120 1291 5923 230
1974 138 129 1093 4248 191
1975 144 126 1041 4280 165
1976 147 134 951 3720 151
1977 149 140 965 3452 135
1978 151 141 1159 4169 163
1979 152 144 1220 4804 200
1980 154 149 1173 4663 183
1981 157 145 1159 4357 183
1982 157 147 1134 3986 151
1983 158 149 1078 3669 157
1984 159 150 1160 3951 172
1985 159 137 1142 3605 113
1986 159 149 895 2715 85
1987 159 152 922 3010 102
1988 159 154 985 3463 124
1989 159 153 1036 3365 117
1990 159 156 1076 3606 125
1991 166 162 1086 3519 127
1992 179 167 932 2962 103
1993 184 175 1062 3433 135
1994 185 178 1142 4040 140
1995 185 172 1255 4306 168
1996 185 181 1220 4149 157
1997 185 176 915 2659 122
1998 185 181 892 2749 115
1999 188 181 857 2567 91
2000 189 178 937 2677 88
2001 189 189 681 1925 78
2002 191 188 588 1465 58
2003 191 189 666 1761 72
2004 191 192 557 1400 61
2005 191 185 505 1311 51
2006 192 193 554 1393 63
2007 192 191 573 1392 52
2008 192 192 609 1498 59
2009 192 193 662 1754 65
2010 192 189 631 1668 58
2011 193 193 709 2097 79
2012 193 194 626 1671 66
2013 193 192 776 2306 71
2014 193 193 555 1451 50
Note: Descriptive statistics for the UNGDC containing 7314 statements delivered by heads of state 
or their representative from 1970–2014. From 2011, the president of the European Commission 
made a separate statement on behalf of the EU. UN: United Nations; GD: General Debate.
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2014). Since the earlier introduction of text scaling meth-
ods, such as Wordscores (Laver et al., 2003) and Wordfish 
(Slapin and Proksch, 2008), to estimate policy positions on 
dimensions of interest, the availability and complexity of 
methods has increased dramatically (Grimmer and Stewart, 
2013; Herzog and Benoit, 2015). The majority of such 
methods are either derived directly from, or can be traced 
to, the natural language processing literature in computer 
science and computational linguistics (e.g. Benoit and 
Nulty, 2013; Lowe, 2008). Wordscores is by far the most 
popular text scaling method in political science based on a 
Google Scholar citation count. It is related to the Naive 
Bayes classifier deployed for text categorisation problems 
(Benoit and Nulty, 2013).
Working with text as data generally involves using the 
bag-of-words approach, whereby each document can be 
represented by a multiset (bag) of its words that disregards 
grammar and word order. Word frequencies in the docu-
ment are then used to classify the document into one of two 
categories. In Wordscores, the learning is supervised by 
providing training documents that are a priori known to 
belong to either category, so that the chosen dimension is 
substantively defined by the choice of training documents.
As an illustration of this approach, we derive from our 
resource estimates of preferences on the very specific issue 
of US–Russia rivalry in world politics. Figure 1 maps 
Wordscores estimates for the 2014 UN GD. We use state-
ments by the US and Russia as reference texts. We there-
fore a priori define the policy dimension as Russia vs US. 
We do not use the resulting scores as an explanatory vari-
able in an empirical application here due to limited space. 
However, such an application would clearly be of value for 
research on international relations. Here, we simply dem-
onstrate how it is possible to derive estimates of 
Figure 1. Wordscores map 2014.
Note: The scores are estimated in quanteda package (version 0.9.9-3) in R (Benoit et al., n.d.). We follow standard preprocessing during the tokeni-
sation stage, remove English stopwords and perform stemming. We also trim the document-feature matrix to have features that appear at least five 
times in three documents. The US is given reference score (+1) and Russia (–1). Results are rescaled using classical LBG rescale, hence predicted 
scores may be beyond the ( − +1; 1) range.
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differences between UN member states from our resource 
using the text as data approach.
Empirical application: Preferences on 
multiple dimensions
While estimating state preferences on single-issue dimen-
sions has many benefits, countries routinely express prefer-
ences on multiple dimensions of foreign policy. We 
therefore turn to correspondence analysis (CA) – a dimen-
sionality reduction technique (e.g. Bonica, 2013). In CA, 
the first dimension is fitted to explain maximal variation in 
the data, while subsequent dimensions explain maximal 
residual variation (which means dimensions are orthogonal 
to each other). Unlike Wordscores, the definition of the 
dimensions produced by CA must be discerned inductively, 
a posteriori (Laver, 2014). This also implies that the dimen-
sions produced by CA may correspond to single, multiple 
or meta issues. Figure 2 presents the positions over time of 
USA and Russia (opponents) and USA and the UK (allies) 
on the first and second dimensions (CA1 and CA2) uncov-
ered using CA.
Lowe (2016) suggests that position estimated by such 
models is a low dimensional summary of the relative 
emphasis of one topic over another, compared to what 
would be expected by chance. This is consistent with a key 
assumption of the saliency theory of party competition 
(Budge et al., 2001), which posits that the policy differences 
between parties are determined by their contrasting empha-
ses on different issues. In the context of GD statements, the 
CA model fitted to the count data of unique words captures 
countries’ relative emphasis of different issues – and there-
fore the differences in their policy preferences.
A benefit of using CA is that it allows us to easily esti-
mate positions on multiple dimensions. We demonstrate 
the ease of using multidimensional text scaling by includ-
ing the new CA measures in an existing analysis of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and US nonsurrender 
agreements (Kelley, 2007). The format of this article pre-
vents us from covering issues in detail; therefore, the fol-
lowing is intended merely as an illustrative example. In 
brief, the US sought to pressure other states to sign bilat-
eral agreements not to surrender US citizens to the ICC. 
This attempt to seek exceptional treatment was widely 
criticised for inconsistency with international norms, and 
many countries (but not all) turned it down. Kelley (2007: 
573) argues that, for these states, normative preferences 
trumped strategic concerns. Overall, the views on the 
Figure 2. CA1 and CA2 of allies and opponents.
Note: The four subplots show CA estimates for the US, Russia and the UK on the first and second dimensions, as discussed in the text. Overlaid 
lines are loess smoothers.
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nonsurrender agreements were complex and unlikely to be 
reduced to an easily identifiable single-issue dimension.
To determine the optimal number of dimensional esti-
mates to include in the estimate we rely on the leave-one-out 
cross-validation (LOOCV) method (James et al., 2013: 
178). Given the sample size, we considered alternative spec-
ifications with up to 10 CA dimensions, as presented in 
Figure 3.8 For each alternative model we calculate the cross-
validation error. As the LOOCV indicates that the optimal 
number of CA dimensions is three, we include three dimen-
sions to the original specification that predicts whether 
countries signed nonsurrender agreements (Kelley, 2007).
The results presented in the second subplot in Figure 3 
indicate that the CA3 coefficient is statistically significant. 
Figure 3. Choosing optimal number of CA dimensions and the estimated model results.
Note: The upper subplot displays the results of the LOOCV analysis to choose the optimal number of dimensions for the estimated model, as dis-
cussed in the text. The bottom subplot displays the coefficients of the estimated model, as discussed in the text, with 50% and 95% CIs. Coefficients 
in red are statistically significant (at 95% level). The specification has fewer observations than the original analysis as Kelley (2007) includes non-UN 
members or states that did not participate in the GD that year, i.e. with absent text data.
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What does this mean substantively? A detailed discussion 
is limited by the scope of the paper, but we can gain some 
insight from Figure 4, which shows the most important 
words defining the variation on that dimension. The results 
suggest that states who expressed stronger concerns about 
security and terrorism were more likely to sign the non-
surrender agreement. We interpret this as meaning that 
indicating security concerns alongside normative goals 
influenced decisions on whether to sign the nonsurrender 
agreement with the US. It is, however, important to note 
that further analysis would be required to fully support this 
claim.
Conclusion
This paper introduces a new dataset, the UNGDC, for 
understanding and measuring state preferences in world 
politics. We have demonstrated how scholars can extract 
relevant information from the UNGDC using text analytic 
methods. Specifically, we have shown how the UNGDC 
can be used to uncover single and multiple dimensions of 
government preferences, and have provided examples of 
how such estimates can be applied.
Estimates derived from the UNGDC complement exist-
ing measures of government preferences based on UNGA 
voting. In fact, a possible application of the UNGDC would 
be to investigate the relationship between preferences 
expressed by governments in their GD statements and their 
voting behaviour in the UNGA across difference issue 
areas. This would shed light on whether governments 
express their foreign policy preferences in different ways 
depending on the particular audience they face and the 
associated costs.
A benefit of using texts to extract information about 
preferences is that they provide detailed information about 
countries’ views on a particular policy area, and so can be 
compared to other text data. Hence, a future application of 
the UNGDC would be to compare the statements with 
international treaties and laws. Such comparisons can show 
whether some countries have greater influence on specific 
international agreements than others, and how countries 
perceive such agreements. For example, researchers may 
consider the extent to which states adopt language based on 
international law in their GD statements. Finally, in addi-
tion to examining the effects of government preferences, 
the UNGDC can also help us better understand how state 
preferences are formed, and which groups in a country 
influence preferences across different issues.
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Notes
1. As Häge and Hug (2016) explain, the UNGA has always 
practised the adoption of many items on its agenda without a 
formal vote.
2. These quotes are from interviews conducted by Niheer 
Dasandi and Nicola Chelotti with Jaane Taalas (9 June 2015) 
and Christian Doktor (16 June 2015).
3. Foreign Minister Lavrov revealed the issues Russia planned 
to discuss during the 2015 GD two weeks before the debate. 
See http://www.interfax.ru/russia/466392 (accessed 27 August 
2016).
4. The text of individual UNGD addresses is available as part 
of UNGDC browsing tool here: http://www.smikhaylov.net/
ungdc/. Alternatively, full corpus is available to download 
from the Harvard Dataverse “United Nations General Debate 
Corpus” here: http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/0TJX8Y
Figure 4. Word Cloud of top 100 words on CA3.
Note: The 100 words that are listed have the highest loading on CA3; 
the font size is proportional to a word’s contribution to the variation on 
this dimension.
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5. Section 3.4 of the Iraq Inquiry, p.187, see http://www.iraqin-
quiry.org.uk/media/248175/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry_
section-34.pdf (accessed 25 January 2017).
6. We have developed a browsing and visualisation tool that 
allows users to explore individual documents and the top-
ics covered, including the top words that characterise top-
ics, the evolution of topics over time, word distributions 
across topics, the underlying digitised texts of speeches, 
and the source PDFs. The tool can be accessed here: 
http://www.smikhaylov.net/ungdc/. The UNGDC can be 
downloaded from the Harvard Dataverse “United Nations 
General Debate Corpus” here: http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/
DVN/0TJX8Y
7. Detailed information is available for sessions 49–69; tran-
scripts from earlier sessions do not provide the same degree 
of detail regarding the post of the speaker. In the rare cases 
where the post of the speaker was missing in the transcript 
for sessions 49–69, we added this information.
8. We implement the simplest specification search using 
additive models. Users can implement more extensive 
searches using a similar approach, e.g. including interac-
tion terms.
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